Venice Commission has criticised the government’s model of selection to the HQCJ
The High Qualifications Commission of Judges (HQCJ) selects candidates for judicial positions and evaluates sitting judges. Its decisions determine who will work in Ukrainian courts. That is why it is crucial who selects the members of the HQCJ itself, and under what rules. In 2027, almost the entire new composition of this body is due to be selected. The government proposes to bring international experts back into the process of selecting its members. At the same time, however, it substantially changes the rules for their participation compared with the mechanism that has already worked.
The Venice Commission (hereinafter, the Commission) supported the need to continue involving international experts. This is consistent with its previous recommendations and with Ukraine’s European integration commitments. However, it criticised the changes proposed by the government, as they could deprive international experts of real influence over the outcome of the competition.
Under the government’s model, their position could be circumvented during key votes, and their ability to collect and analyse information about candidates could be restricted. Moreover, their term of office may expire before the competition is completed. Taken together, these changes create the risk highlighted by the Venice Commission: international participation will be preserved in form but will lose its substance.
This is set out in the urgent joint opinion of the Venice Commission and the Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law of the Council of Europe of 25 September 2026, CDL-PI(2026)015. The document is to be submitted for endorsement at the plenary session of the Venice Commission on 9–10 October.
DEJURE warned about most of these risks even before the opinion was published. Below, we examine which shortcomings the Commission identified and what needs to change so that the return of international experts does not remain a formality.
(Not) external governance
The participation of international experts in competitions for key positions is often criticised as interference in Ukraine’s sovereignty. The Venice Commission once again disagreed.
The Selection Commission remains a Ukrainian body established by Ukrainian law. Its members are appointed by a Ukrainian body, and the final decision on the appointment of HQCJ members is made by the High Council of Justice. Therefore, international participation is not an external diktat but Ukraine’s own decision on how to protect the competition from domestic political and corporate influence.
There is, however, another important conclusion. The “temporary” nature of international participation, the Commission stresses, is determined not by a specific date but by the fulfilment of the task for which this mechanism was created. Following the Commission’s logic, “the involvement of international experts in the High Council of Justice and the High Qualifications Commission of Judges should not only continue but should be long-term, until the reform produces the proper result of cleansing the entire judicial system.”
A decisive vote must be truly decisive
The government proposes to retain the special role of international experts in the integrity assessment of candidates. But when the competition moves on to the assessment of professional competence, the rules change.
A candidate can be knocked out of the competition without the support of two international experts. In effect, the Ukrainian part of the Selection Commission gains the ability to block an unwanted candidate even after that candidate has successfully passed the integrity assessment.
The Commission also sees a problem in this. It recommends applying the same rule to all key decisions concerning candidates: integrity, professional competence and the formation of the final list. A decision should require four votes, at least two of which come from internationally nominated members. If a deadlock persists after a repeat vote, the position of the group that includes the two international members should prevail.
A Ukrainian passport should not be a mandatory requirement for the international quota
Another piece of government “know-how” is to oblige international organisations to nominate at least one Ukrainian citizen among their three nominees. A Ukrainian passport in itself obviously makes a person neither dependent nor lacking in integrity. The Commission does not claim this either.
But the international quota exists, among other things, so that its members are as distanced as possible from domestic professional, corporate and political conflicts. International partners may nominate a Ukrainian if they consider that person the best candidate, but the law should not compel them to do so.
The Commission separately notes that members of the Selection Commission who live and work in Ukraine are objectively more exposed to domestic pressure. Therefore, the international quota must be international not only in name.
The international quota must not be handed over to unreformed bodies
Under the government’s design, if international organisations fail to propose enough candidates on time, their seats may pass to the Council of Prosecutors, the Council of Attorneys and the National Academy of Legal Sciences. In other words, the international safeguard may at some point simply disappear.
The Commission recommends removing this mechanism. A far more logical alternative is to give international organisations additional time. If parliament nevertheless wants to create a fallback mechanism, the nomination should be transferred to a neutral entity that would preserve the specifically international character of the quota.
Two years, and the international members leave even if the competition is not over
Another problem is the two-year term of the Selection Commission. The history of competitions for public office has repeatedly shown that the procedure can drag on for a very long time. And if the international members are guaranteed to lose their powers after two years regardless of the outcome, the very protraction of the procedure begins to affect the balance of power in the competition. It is enough for the competition not to be completed on time, and the safeguard simply ceases to operate.
The Venice Commission recommends a different logic: the Selection Commission should retain its powers until it has completed its task.
International members need more than just interpreters
Last time, members of the Selection Commission had assistants who could collect and analyse information about candidates. The government draft law significantly weakens this capacity and effectively makes the Selection Commission dependent on the HCJ secretariat.
The Venice Commission proposed the opposite approach. The Selection Commission should have its own secretariat and analytical support, accountable exclusively to it. The HCJ secretariat should provide only limited logistical and technical assistance. At the very least, members of the Selection Commission should regain the ability to engage assistants, not just interpreters.
The HCJ should not screen out candidates before the competition even begins
In our analysis, we also drew attention to the excessive role of the HCJ in the initial admission of candidates. If a body can refuse to admit a candidate on the basis of its assessment of documents before the Selection Commission has even started work, a formal check can easily turn into a separate, hidden stage of the competition.
The Commission recommends clearly limiting this stage to a formal check of documents and of compliance with basic requirements. A refusal must be reasoned and open to review. And decisions of the Selection Commission not to admit or not to recommend a candidate should be open to appeal in court on procedural grounds within short time limits, without blocking the entire competition.
The Venice Commission also found problems in the HCJ selection
The opinion concerns more than the HQCJ. For example, the Venice Commission again recommends abandoning the requirement that the Ethics Council submit at least twice as many candidates as there are vacant positions in the HCJ.
The logic is simple: a candidate either meets the criteria of integrity and professional ethics or does not. Ranking people by degree of integrity makes no sense. The Ethics Council should recommend everyone who meets the criteria.
Likewise, the Venice Commission takes a critical view of additional interviews of candidates after vetting by the Ethics Council. If such interviews are retained, they should at least not allow a candidate who has already passed the statutory filter to be excluded again.
The biggest problem is not each provision separately, but all of them together
And this is where the Venice Commission’s opinion matters most.
Taken separately, the two-year term can be explained by the need for time limits. The transfer of documents to the HCJ secretariat can be explained by convenience. A different voting rule on professional competence can be explained by a desire to balance positions. A Ukrainian in the international quota can be explained by knowledge of national legislation.
But when these details are put together, the picture changes. The HCJ and its secretariat gain more control over the admission of candidates, lists, materials and the organisation of work. For some decisions, one international member’s vote is enough, or it can be dispensed with altogether. The international quota can be transferred to national bodies. The Selection Commission ceases work after two years regardless of whether the competition has been completed. There are no separate guarantees of judicial review.
That is why the Venice Commission warns that it is precisely the cumulative effect that could render international participation meaningless.
A separate set of criticisms concerns not the content but the manner in which the draft law was prepared. The Venice Commission notes that the process has so far not met the standards of good law-making. A reform of this scale requires transparent and inclusive consultations, including with civil society, and every departure from the previous model must be properly explained.
What parliament must do now
Following the Commission’s opinion, the debate on whether international experts are needed in the selection of the HQCJ can finally be closed: they are. The question is whether they will have real influence.
The final text of the draft law must take into account all of the Commission’s suggestions, so that the international quota cannot be circumvented, key decisions are not taken without the international members, and the Selection Commission itself does not depend on the HCJ and can work until the competition is completed.
Because the point of the reform is not for international members to sit at the table. It is to ensure that the system cannot push predetermined candidates through the competition.
