The Venice Commission criticised Draft Law No. 14149 on the selection of Constitutional Court judges - 81ADB
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The Venice Commission criticised Draft Law No. 14149 on the selection of Constitutional Court judges

The Venice Commission has published its opinion on Draft Law No. 14149, effectively confirming what the DEJURE Foundation warned about from the very beginning: the changes proposed by the authorities create serious risks to the independence of the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE).

The authors of the draft law present it as an “improvement” of the procedure for selecting Constitutional Court judges. However, behind this wording lie other risks, which the Venice Commission outlined in its official opinion on the draft law.

How exactly is the independence of the Advisory Group of Experts proposed to be weakened?

The Venice Commission highlights several key issues:

  • “Auxiliary” status of the AGE. The draft law proposes to formally define the Advisory Group of Experts as an “auxiliary body.” In the Ukrainian context, this does not mean a neutral technical role, but rather a risk of subordination to political appointing authorities. The Venice Commission explicitly recommends not including this provision in the law, as it is unnecessary and potentially harmful to the independence of the AGE.

  • Administrative control by the Constitutional Court itself. The draft law envisages transferring the secretarial and administrative functions of the AGE to the Secretariat of the Constitutional Court. The Venice Commission warns that this could create additional levers of influence by the Court over a body that is supposed to be independent from it. In other words, mechanisms of control are embedded in the law.

  • Disclosure of AGE materials. The draft law obliges the AGE to provide parliament and other appointing authorities with copies of all documents and all information collected during the assessment of candidates.

The Venice Commission separately emphasised that the confidentiality of the AGE’s internal assessments is a key condition for trust in the competition. It protects candidates from reputational harm, prevents pressure and information leaks, and ensures that strong candidates do not withdraw from the selection process. An unconditional requirement to transfer the entire body of data destroys this balance.

The Commission also sees a particular danger in the wording concerning “assessed candidates.” In its current form, it may be interpreted in such a way that appointing authorities would gain access not only to materials on shortlisted candidates, but also on those deemed unsuitable by the AGE. This creates a risk of a de facto “reassessment” of the conclusions of independent experts by political bodies—and a return to the competition of candidates who failed the integrity filter.

For this reason, the Venice Commission recommends clearly stipulating that data on non-selected candidates must not be disclosed, and defining precisely what information the AGE may disclose and what it may not.

The DEJURE Foundation welcomes the Venice Commission’s opinion on Draft Law No. 14149, as, unlike some previous opinions on judicial reform, this document clearly identifies the threats that could lead to a weakening of the role of independent experts in the selection of Constitutional Court judges.

We call on Members of Parliament to take the Venice Commission’s opinion into account and not to adopt Draft Law No. 14149 or the alternative Draft Law No. 14149-1.

In their current wording, these initiatives undermine the independence of the Advisory Group of Experts and jeopardise the entire competition for the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. And with it, the chance for a truly independent Constitutional Court, without which no reforms will work.

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