“European Standards” as an illusion of progress: why Ukraine needs international experts in judicial selection
By Mykhailo Zhernakov, Executive Director of the DEJURE Foundation
Karyna Hasymova, Advocacy Manager at the DEJURE Foundation
for European Pravda
Calls to abandon the participation of international experts in judicial selection processes are becoming increasingly common, both from some politicians and certain members of the legal community. One of their main arguments is “European standards,” a set of supposed rules we must strictly follow without deviating an inch. After all, that’s how it works in Europe, so Ukraine should adopt the same rules.
At first glance, this argument sounds persuasive. In reality, however, it is a dangerous oversimplification and sometimes a deliberate distortion of how justice systems in the EU actually function.
What do European standards in the justice sector really mean?
First and foremost, it is important to separate myth from reality. There are no rigid, mandatory EU standards in the field of justice. What exists are general principles: the rule of law, judicial independence, and access to justice. In addition, there are numerous recommendations from the Council of Europe and its bodies, such as the Consultative Council of European Judges and the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors, which are composed of members from the same professions (judges, prosecutors, etc.). Unsurprisingly, they do not aim to produce recommendations that would be uncomfortable for their peers.
It is also crucial to understand that these recommendations constitute soft law — they provide guidance worth considering, but are not to be mechanically implemented. Moreover, they were developed for entirely different contexts: legal systems that have been functioning effectively for decades. For instance, in Denmark, 88% of citizens trust their courts, while in Germany, the figure is over 70%. These outcomes were achieved thanks to minimal political interference in the judiciary and a high level of judicial integrity.
In such settings, the formula “judges elected by judges” makes sense: the judiciary selects its own members and ensures integrity from within. The President and Parliament do not interfere with judicial governance bodies or exert pressure on the courts. As a result, judges are not afraid to adjudicate cases involving high-level officials. The goal in these systems is to preserve the status quo of a well-functioning rule-of-law framework.
The same cannot be said for Ukraine. The situation here is the exact opposite. Unfortunately, Ukraine’s judiciary continues to struggle with deep-rooted challenges and suffers from the lowest levels of public trust. According to recent surveys, 69% of Ukrainians do NOT trust the highest judicial institution — the Supreme Court. Systemic corruption and bribery, along with concerns over independence and impartiality, severely undermine the judiciary’s effectiveness.
Thus, if we apply “European standards” of judicial governance to a system that has never undergone genuine cleansing, we risk preserving the status quo and its familiar dysfunctions. Instead of independent governance, we get a new form of old problems: institutions where professional insiders appoint their associates and operate for personal benefit rather than the interests of justice. That is not a path toward the EU — it’s a path to collapse. And Ukraine has already learned that lesson the hard way in the judicial sector.
What went wrong in Ukraine and other transitional democracies
In 2016, Ukraine enshrined the principle of “judicial self-governance” in law: 11 out of 21 members of the High Council of Justice (HCJ) were to be judges elected by other judges. In the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ), the share of judges reached two-thirds. And what was the result? The selection of new candidates failed. Only about 0.5% of judges were dismissed as a result of the qualification assessment. The previous composition of the HCJ became embroiled in a series of scandals and failed to dismiss even the most notorious figures. Worse still, the scandal-plagued judge Pavlo Vovk was not even temporarily suspended from administering justice.
This is not a uniquely Ukrainian problem. Several Central and Eastern European countries, such as Slovakia and Poland, that followed a similar path, also introduced judicial councils with a majority of “judges elected by judges.” The outcomes have ranged from questionable to outright disastrous.
In Georgia and Moldova, which likewise adopted the model of “judges electing judges,” the results were similar: corruption, political dependence, and a closed circle of insiders promoting their own. The Venice Commission has recognised this pattern in its opinions on judicial reforms in Albania and Moldova. In particular, its opinion CDL-REF(2019)031-e on Moldova’s judicial reform noted that in some post-communist countries, excessively high standards of judicial independence can “lead to a paradox,” where guarantees of independence are extended to judges who are neither independent nor of high integrity. The Commission recommended that Moldova establish a temporary mechanism to cleanse the judiciary of low-integrity judges.
Research shows that in many transitional democracies, blindly adopting “European” standards does more harm than good. Judicial governance bodies often become closed circles serving their own interests, suppressing reformers, and blocking any meaningful cleansing.
What works instead: the role of international experts
In contrast, genuine results in improving the justice system have come from models in which international experts played a key role in judicial selection.
For example, the Public Council of International Experts (PCIE) effectively prevented nearly every clearly low-integrity candidate from entering the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC). As a result, the HACC has already delivered over 200 verdicts in high-level corruption cases.
Both the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ) and the High Council of Justice (HCJ), which were reformed with the casting vote of international experts, have demonstrated markedly improved performance over the past year and a half. The HQCJ recommended the dismissal of 51 low-integrity judges, while the HCJ confirmed the dismissal of 52 judges, including the aforementioned Pavlo Vovk, whom the previous HCJ failed even to suspend.
It was precisely the involvement of foreign experts that ensured a fair competition for the head of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), despite political interference. An independent international audit confirmed the effectiveness of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU). In 2024, the participation of international experts in the selection commission for the head of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) ensured transparency in the process and strengthened public trust in its outcome. Under its renewed leadership, the NACP has improved its performance and made tangible progress in shaping national anti-corruption policy.
A recent example is the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine (ESBU). It clearly demonstrated the contrast between the positions of Ukrainian and international experts. The latter almost saved the competition for the ESBU director from failure, as they blocked the appointment of candidates with dubious reputations supported by the authorities. Unfortunately, with the backing of the political authorities’ representatives, the Cabinet refused to appoint the competition’s winner, completely undermining the transparency of the process and allowing politically engaged forces to regain control.
These examples clearly show that effective solutions must come from outside the system. In Ukraine, the model involving international experts is evidently the most effective.
When international experts are removed, reforms fail
Ukraine’s reform history offers real examples of failed initiatives — all of which lacked the involvement of international experts.
The Supreme Court (2016–2017): A quarter of the judges appointed to the new Supreme Court had received negative assessments from the Public Integrity Council (PIC), which evaluated candidates based on criteria of ethics and integrity. Even more candidates had information disclosed by the PIC, suggesting low integrity — among them former Supreme Court Chief Justice Vsevolod Kniaziev, who was later caught accepting a bribe of nearly $3 million. The previous HQCJ simply ignored these findings, and the old HCJ approved the appointments.
The State Bureau of Investigation (SBI): Competitions for key positions in the SBI were held without independent international experts and were plagued by secrecy and political influence. The outcomes were predictable: rather than effectively investigating crimes involving top officials or military personnel, the SBI was used to pressure the HQCJ at the behest of the judicial elites.
The list goes on: the first iteration of the NACP, the ESBU, established in 2021, the re-attestation of prosecutors and police — all were formed without international involvement. The results speak for themselves.
This proves that the idea of “professionals choosing their associates” only works when those professionals act in the interest of society and the institution they represent. That is not the case in Ukraine today. The involvement of figures such as judges of the Maidan-era courts — Volodymyr Kuzmenko, Yurii Triasun, or former Supreme Court Chief Justice under Yanukovych, Yaroslav Romaniuk — in selection bodies is yet another proof.
Entrusting people like these with recruiting the next generation of judges is like asking bank robbers to guard the vault.
International experts are not a symbol of weakness, but a tool for transition
Recently, there have been growing calls, including from within state institutions, for the gradual phase-out of international experts. But crucial here is gradual. This should happen only once Ukrainian institutions prove themselves capable of conducting fair and integrity-based selections without international assistance. Unfortunately, that has not happened yet. On the contrary, the current competition for the HQCJ demonstrates a dangerous trend: international experts are being replaced by unreformed domestic bodies. For example, the Council of Judges systematically delegates low-integrity candidates to selection commissions, and the Bar Council, headed by Lidiia Izovitova, a long-time associate of Medvedchuk, is taking on a greater role.
So, when should international experts withdraw? The answer is clear: when Ukrainian institutions, such as the judiciary, prosecution, and the Bar, begin nominating candidates who are no worse than those recommended by international experts. Until that moment, international participation remains essential. Hiding behind the notion of “European standards,” mechanically copying and pasting them into Ukraine’s vastly different context, leads nowhere — except off a cliff.
Moreover, when we talk about “European standards,” it is important to distinguish between recommendations designed for entirely different legal cultures, such as Council of Europe documents, and the documents that specifically define what is expected of Ukraine in the context of EU integration. These include the European Commission’s annual Enlargement Reports, especially the most recent one on Ukraine, and the “seven steps” Ukraine must fulfil for accession candidate status. These are the documents that actually carry weight in defining what “European standards” mean for Ukraine.
Just look at the first two of the seven steps: reform of the Constitutional Court and the reboot of the HQCJ and HCJ with international expert participation. Both clearly emphasise the need for involving external, independent experts. These documents were not written in abstract terms — they reflect deep analysis of Ukraine’s realities, past successes, and reform failures.
This is where a crucial choice lies, both for Ukraine and its partners. One can continue relying on “classic” approaches formulated decades ago, like old military manuals claiming wars are won with infantry and artillery. Or one can recognise that the world has changed — and that different tools are working now. Not the ones that used to work, but the ones that actually work today. In Ukraine’s case, that means engaging international experts in judicial selections.
There is already a legislative initiative in parliament, though it has not yet received enough attention: in June, draft law No. 13382 was registered. It proposes restoring the mandate of independent international experts and extending their role in the HQCJ Selection Commission for at least three more years. This draft law is a logical continuation of a successful practice. Because the true path to the EU lies not in symbolic gestures, but in decisive actions. And now is the time to take one of them.
